Analysis: Big winner from EU expansion: Washington

The European Union's coming enlargement to 25 members, including many former Soviet bloc countries now entering NATO, seems sure to increase the United States' overall influence in Europe and within the EU — while putting aside for the time being the idea of an emergent Germany leading the continent from Berlin.

.

The entry of these essentially pro-American countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU, according to a German official, also signifies the end of any attempts within the EU to define itself and its evolving foreign and security policy as aligned against the United States.

.

"You can no longer muster a majority for that," said Karsten Voight, the German Foreign Ministry's coordinator for German-American relations.

.

These orientations, previously a subject of wary articulation in public, are now being openly acknowledged by EU policymakers as they prepare for a summit meeting in Copenhagen on Thursday and Friday that will open the community further eastward and address Turkey's possible membership.

.

For policymakers in several European countries, the new members-to-be from the old Soviet world, after a decade's transition from subjugation, remain existentially concerned with maintaining their national independence and identity. This means that the new EU members continue to see the United States, rather than any European neighbor or the EU itself, as the principal guarantor of their young democracies, and the essential political reference point in creating a future that is secure and prosperous.

.

As far as the controversial candidacy of Turkey goes, the United States, at virtually no cost and at high profit in its relations with Ankara, has been the single, unequivocal backer of its entry into the EU for decades. Until recently, much of Europe appeared to be satisfied with making long-term assurances to Turkey on eventual membership that some EU leaders clearly hoped they would never have to fulfill.

.

With Turkey's future in the EU still vague, the increase in American influence in the EU is channeled through the former Soviet satellites.

.

"What they want to join is the euro-Atlantic community," said Denis MacShane, Britain's minister for Europe, using a phrase heard with frequency these days that reflects the newcomers' mindset blending the EU and NATO increasingly together. "They want the Atlantic to be the same width as the Oder or Dneipr rivers."

.

Although the United States through James Baker 3d, when he was secretary of state, specifically talked as the Berlin Wall came down of forging a more "organic" relationship with the EU — perhaps with less conviction than opportunism — it has obviously no interest now in speaking officially about a development that is to its advantage, but enormously sensitive in relation to European self-esteem.

.

President Alexander Kwasniewski of Poland caught that note recently in insisting, "To say that we're a Trojan horse of the United States" in the EU "is unjust." But he also asserted that "there would be no Europe without American democracy," and that the EU's stringent conditions for entry meant risking "what there is left of enthusiasm" for joining the organization.

.

German leaders were reported struck by the bluntly pro-American tone of a recent initiative of the so-called Vilnius Group, 10 former Soviet bloc countries, presenting themselves as part of a potential coalition committed with the United States to the disarming of Iraq.

.

A declaration by the group, virtually all EU candidates, coinciding with the NATO summit meeting in Prague in November, showed them to be ahead in terms of support for the Americans than many of the EU's senior member states. In describing their ultimate goals in being participants in both the EU and NATO, the countries spoke of their commitment to peace and stability throughout the "euro-Atlantic community."

.

All the same, America's increased insertion in the process of European unification is not what history might have expected.

.

In the early 1990s, following Germany's reunification and the fall of the Soviet Union, it was widely assumed that Germany would be the dominant beneficiary of Europe's opening to the East. Besides the economic advantages of Berlin's proximity, it was often thought that Germany would provide political leadership for the countries of the old Soviet orbit and in the process emerge as the essential political force, East and West, in all of Europe.

.

As discussions about shifts in Europe's political center of gravity to Berlin became commonplace, countries like France or the Netherlands guardedly expressed concern about German predominance in a reorganized and revitalized Europe.

.

But reality worked in other ways. In Germany, the last decade has been one of economic stagnation, with a vast drain of resources going toward absorbing the debris of East German Communist rule. In the process, the old West German type of high-cost, low-risk capitalism virtually disappeared as a model for development.

.

While the German economy has remained predominant in commerce with Eastern Europe, its power diminished overall in European and international terms. At the same time, neither Germany's political reach nor Germany's comfort in acting as an initiator or defender of democracy palpably increased.

.

In the end, Germany was seen less as a prime mover in opening up NATO membership to the former satellite states, than as a hard, largely self-interested bargainer laying down tough economic and social conditions for the individual applicants' entry into the EU. In the process, what 10 years ago was once the notion of Eastern Europe (or Turkey) lining up in grateful allegiance behind Germany on a unified Continent, disintegrated.

.

Voigt, the Social Democrat who serves as the German Foreign Ministry's coordinator for American relations, put the situation this way: "The Germans are needed, but they have to think more generally. There is a problem, and it involves the view of a Germany acting provincially."

.

More important, with the addition of the former Soviet bloc countries to the EU, Voigt said: "Any concept attempting to define the EU as an organization that is basically against the United States is no longer able to muster a majority. That temptation is finished. As an enlarged Europe comes into being and defines itself, that view of (an antagonistic) Europe, or that American analysis of what the EU means, is overtaken."

.

This interpretation or perception appears to have reached some of France's most sophisticated European planners, a number of whom have been the most prone to regard an expanded EU as creating a global force to counter-balance for the United States.

.

Jacques Delors, the former president of the European Commission, now talks, for example, of a Europe whose ambition is to be "influential." This contrasts with the French notion of "Europe puissance" — or roughly, Europe as a competitor for world political power — that has had extensive appeal in Paris.

.

But interpretations of the significance of the growth of American influence through the enlargement processes, and at a time the EU is trying a more unified foreign policy and security approach, is not characterized only as one of advantage to the United States.

.

Poland, for example, has been describing itself as a bridge to understanding between the United States and Europe.

.

Friedbert Pflueger, the foreign policy spokesman of the Christian Democrat grouping in the German Bundestag, said flatly that the "influence of the United States will be fostered by the Central and East European countries which look more to the U.S. than to Europe."

.

But he analyzed the circumstances as essentially positive ones, especially in a situation where opinion polls and politicians in Europe, as well as the substantially higher economic growth rates projected for the United States than for the EU in 2003, have recently emphasized their conflicts and differences.

.

"This double enlargement by Central and East European countries," Pflueger said, "is a great chance. The idea that these new countries could serve as a bridge has real importance to both sides of the Atlantic, which are growing apart."

Source

U.S.: Rumsfeld's 'Old' And 'New' Europe Touches On Uneasy Divide

By Mark Baker

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld touched a nerve in Europe this week, dividing the continent into what he called "old Europe" and "new Europe." Reaction from France and Germany -- which Rumsfeld put squarely in the "old" category -- was swift and harsh. But the U.S. official's underlying point cannot be denied. On Iraq, divisions in Europe appear to run deep, with the main fault line falling between NATO's "older" European members and its new ones.

Prague, 24 January 2003 (RFE/RL) -- U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld this week put his finger on an uncomfortable division in Europe with his comment that the continent could be broken into "old" and "new" categories -- at least with respect to its thinking on Iraq.

Rumsfeld, responding to a reporter's question on 22 January about "European" opposition to the use of force in Iraq, said the reporter meant France and Germany, which were part of "old" Europe. He contrasted them with the vitality of the "new" Europe -- made up in large part of NATO's new, formerly communist, inductees.

"You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't. I think that's 'old Europe.' If you look at the entire NATO Europe today, the center of gravity is shifting to the East. And there are a lot of new members. And if you just take the list of all the members of NATO and all of those who have been invited in recently -- what is it, 26, something like that? [But] you're right. Germany has been a problem, and France has been a problem."

Rumsfeld continued, "You look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe. They're not with France and Germany [regarding Iraq], they're with the United States."

The reaction from Germany and France -- who oppose what they see as an overly hasty call to arms by the United States -- was swift and harsh. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer implied that Rumsfeld's comments were irrational.

"Mr. Rumsfeld has described the Europeans as 'old.' Indeed, they are -- as far as the creation of a state or culture is concerned, [they are] older than the United States. I don't want to comment any further. But one should deal with each other rationally and with common sense."

A French government spokesman, Jean-Francois Cope, noted pointedly that being old also meant being wise. He said: "An 'old' continent -- a continent somewhat ancient in its historical, cultural, political, economic traditions -- can sometimes be infused with a certain wisdom, and wisdom can sometimes make for good advice."

But the underlying point of Rumsfeld's comment -- however blunt -- cannot be denied. Certainly, at least in their public comments, NATO's "new" European members are more supportive of the U.S. position on Iraq than its "older" ones.

One example is Hungary, which -- along with Poland and the Czech Republic -- joined NATO in 1999. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry this week said Hungary would prefer to have the backing of the UN Security Council for any military action in Iraq, but -- like the U.S. -- it would be willing to support war without an additional council resolution. Foreign Ministry spokesman Tomas Toth tells RFE/RL, "Number one, what we want is a peaceful solution. Number two, if a military solution is needed then [this should be pursued] with a Security Council mandate, and if all this is not possible, then, a military solution without the Security Council mandate is [still better than to wait] and see what Saddam Hussein is going to do with his weapons [of mass destruction]."

Poland and the Czech Republic in recent days have also indicated at least some support for the U.S. position. Polish Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz on 21 January said his country would back U.S. action in Iraq "without the agreement of the United Nations." The Czech Republic has stationed a chemical- and biological-warfare unit in Kuwait, although it says it will not deploy the unit in Iraq without a second UN resolution.

None of the seven formerly communist countries invited last year to join the alliance has come out against the U.S. position, and one of the seven -- Lithuania -- confirmed this week it will offer some limited assistance to the U.S. if necessary.

This contrasts sharply with some of NATO's older European members. Germany, from the start, has opposed the use of force in Iraq, and France hinted at the Security Council that it could use its veto to block a second resolution mandating an armed attack. This week, France and Germany, along with fellow "old" NATO members Belgium and Luxembourg, voted to block a U.S. request for limited military assistance.

The "old" and "new" distinction has its limits. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, all older NATO members, have said they back the U.S. position.

It's not clear how far Rumsfeld's comments represent official U.S. thinking on Europe, although they clearly echo remarks by President George W. Bush at last year's NATO summit in Prague and immediately afterward. It was in Prague that the military alliance agreed to invite the seven new members: Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Speaking in Vilnius the day after the summit, Bush praised the Lithuanians -- and, by extension, all of the citizens of NATO's former communist states -- by saying that life under a dictatorship had made them more appreciative of human freedom.

"You have known cruel oppression, and you withstood it. You were held captive by an empire and you outlived it. And because you have paid its cost, you know the value of human freedom."

It's also not clear yet how far NATO's new members can go toward pleasing the U.S. without jeopardizing their -- arguably greater -- interests in joining the European Union, where France and Germany hold most of the cards and where being part of the "old" Europe is vastly preferable to being part of the "new."

Anthony Galabov, from the Institute for Sociology of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, touched on this concern in comments to RFE/RL's Bulgarian Service.

"On one hand, Bulgaria explicitly has to continue to support the necessity of united action sanctioned by the UN against Iraq. At the same time, Bulgaria should demonstrate firmly that it is a part of that Europe called the 'old' one. Anything else would put in doubt whether Bulgaria can sustain its efforts at European integration."

Five of NATO's seven new members are hoping to join the EU in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania hope to get in by 2007.

(RFE/RL's Eugen Tomiuc, Diana Ivanova, and Tanya Kancheva contributed to this report.)